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Abstract: 
An experience-sampling study of 124 under-graduates, pretested on complex memory-span tasks, examined the 
relation between working memory capacity (WMC) and the experience of mind wandering in daily life. Over 7 
days, personal digital assistants signaled subjects eight times daily to report immediately whether their thoughts 
had wandered from their current activity, and to describe their psychological and physical context. WMC 
moderated the relation between mind wandering and activities‘ cognitive demand. During challenging activities 
requiring concentration and effort, higher-WMC subjects maintained on-task thoughts better, and mind-
wandered less, than did lower-WMC subjects. The results were there-fore consistent with theories of WMC 
emphasizing the role of executive attention and control processes in determining individual differences and their 
cognitive consequences. 
 
Article: 
People who differ in cognitive ability, as measured by conventional intelligence tests, have different life 
experiences. On average, those with higher general intelligence earn better school grades, attain more education, 
secure more prestigious occupations, are less often killed in automobile accidents, and assume lower 
incarceration risk than do those with lower intelligence (Gottfredson, 2002). But does cognitive ability predict 
people‘s subjective experience of life events? Personality research suggests that people of higher intelligence 
are modestly more ―open to experience‖ (aesthetically sensitive, novelty seeking, unconventional, curious) than 
are people of lower intelligence (Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997). Yet we know of no scientific studies 
concerning the in-the-moment, dynamic phenomenology of cognitive ability. This is unfortunate because 
cognitive-mechanistic theories of intelligence, whether emphasizing sensory discrimination, processing speed, 
or working memory, implicitly predict that variation in these mental systems‘ effectiveness should have 
dramatic consequences for everyday information processing and mental life. Therefore, in the present study, we 
examined whether working memory capacity (WMC), an important individual differences variable measured in 
the laboratory, predicts people‘s subjective experience of task-unrelated thought, or mind wandering, in daily 
life. 
 
WMC IN THE LABORATORY 
Researchers often assess WMC with complex span tasks, which present short lists of stimuli for subjects to 
remember in serial order. These tasks differ from simple span tasks (such as digit span tasks) in that memoranda 
are presented in alternation with a secondary task (Conway et al., 2005). For example, in a reading span 
(RSPAN) task, subjects might memorize short lists of letters, with each letter preceded by an unrelated sentence 
to judge for meaningfulness; in an operation span (OSPAN) task, each letter is preceded by an equation to 
verify. The insertion of secondary tasks between memory items means that subjects are required to recall 
information that is periodically unattended (Barrouillet, Bernadin, & Camos, 2004) and vulnerable to pro-active 
interference (Lustig, May, & Hasher, 2001). 
WMC tasks are of increasing theoretical and practical interest because their scores reliably predict individual 
differences in many higher-order cognitive abilities, such as comprehension, learning, and fluid intelligence 
(Barrett, Tugade, & Engle, 2004; Kane, Hambrick, & Conway, 2005). WMC tasks thus measure 
something important and general. Engle and Kane (2004) proposed that WMC task performance is influenced 
by many psychological processes, but its broad prediction of ability derives from domain-general executive-
control mechanisms. According to their executive-attention theory, these general control mechanisms 
principally maintain or recover access to information (stimulus representations or goals) outside of conscious 
focus, and they are most important in contexts providing concurrent distraction and interference from prior 
experience. 
 
Indeed, people with higher WMC outperform those with lower WMC on attention tasks requiring the active 
maintenance of novel goals in order to override habitual responding (Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001). 
In Stroop tasks, for example, if few trials reinforce the goal to ignore the color words and name their hues 
(because most words and hues match), low-WMC subjects frequently respond according to habit by reading the 
words (Kane & Engle, 2003). We have argued that such goal neglect reflects an inability to keep goals 
consistently active and accessible enough, in the moment, to control thought and behavior according to novel 
demands. Low-WMC subjects seem to periodically lose focus on their goals, or ―zone out‖ (Schooler, Reichle, 
& Halpern, 2004), when executive control is challenged. 
 
WMC IN DAILY LIFE? 
Individual differences in WMC predict performance on formal intellectual tasks in daily life, such as the SAT 
(Daneman & Merikle, 1996). Such findings indicate that WMC is not merely a laboratory phenomenon. That 
said, as with intelligence, little is known about how psychological experiences, especially those that occur in 
everyday contexts, might differ depending on WMC. Experimental research suggests that individual differences 
in WMC predict the regulation of thought and behavior, with lower-WMC individuals being more prone to 
distraction and impulsive error (Kane & Engle, 2003). One might therefore predict that in everyday life, lower-
WMC subjects would be more vulnerable to mind wandering than higher-WMC subjects. 
 
Then again, not all of life‘s contexts demand executive control (Bargh & Ferguson, 2000). WMC should 
therefore predict thought flow (i.e., propensity to mind wander) primarily in life situations that replicate the 
laboratory requirement to sustain focused concentration on goal-directed behavior through considerable self-
regulation and mental effort. By the executive-attention view of WMC (Engle & Kane, 2004), then, mind 
wandering—defined as thoughts or images that are not directed toward one‘s current activity—would represent 
an occasional, but consequential, cognitive failure that people with lower WMC should be more vulnerable to 
than are people with higher WMC. Challenging intellectual activities are unlikely to be performed well in the 
absence of focused, executive attention, and so these contexts should be most diagnostic of WMC-related 
variation in off-task thinking. 
 
EXPERIENCE-SAMPLING METHODOLOGY 
We examined the relation between laboratory-assessed WMC and self-reported thought focus in daily life by 
using the experience-sampling methodology (ESM; Csikszentmihalyi, Larson, & Prescott, 1977). ESM is a 
widely used, within-day assessment technique that randomly prompts subjects to complete brief questionnaires 
(Scollon, Kim-Prieto, & Diener, 2003). Its particular strengths are (a) multiple measurements in people‘s daily 
environment, enhancing reliability and ecological validity; (b) reports of immediate experience, minimizing 
retrospective bias; and (c) assessment of contextual influences on experience. 
 
In our study, subjects were prompted to report their thoughts during their daily routines. In contrast to less 
constrained thought-sampling procedures in which subjects continuously verbalize or record their thoughts 
(e.g., Antrobus & Singer, 1964; Klinger, 1978), our procedure required subjects to answer only a few closed-
ended questions about their experience and context at unpredictable times. Our method was thus similar to 
assessing task-unrelated thoughts during laboratory tests (Singer, 1978; Smallwood & Schooler, 2006) by 
periodically probing subjects to categorize their recent thoughts as being on-task or off-task. 
Considerable research has demonstrated the reliability and validity of probed thought reports, in and out of the 
laboratory. Most laboratory investigations have examined mind wandering during vigilance or reading tasks, 
and they have found, for ex-ample, that task-unrelated thoughts increase with slower stimulus rates, 
experimenter-induced anxiety, and less executive-demanding tasks (Antrobus, 1968; Grodsky & Giambra, 
1990– 1991; Teasdale et al., 1995). Also, people whose thoughts wander more frequently perform their primary 
tasks more poorly than people whose thoughts do not wander as frequently (Schooler et al., 2004), and these 
individual differences in mind wandering are reliable across time and different tasks (Giambra, 1995; Grodsky 
& Giambra, 1990–1991) and are predicted by disorders of attention and mood (Giambra, Grodsky, Belongie, & 
Rosenberg, 1994–1995; Shaw & Giambra, 1993). In daily life, ESM studies have shown that 30 to 40% of 
reported thoughts are classifiable as mind wandering (Klinger & Cox, 1987–1988), that adolescents‘ 
concentration improves during challenging activities in which they are skilled (e.g., Moneta & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 1996), and that most off-task thoughts represent subjects‘ ―current concerns‖ rather than 
fantasy (Klinger, 1978). 
 
OVERVIEW OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
In a novel combination of ESM and cognitive psychology methods, we tested whether an objective, laboratory 
assessment of WMC would predict the subjective, feral experience of mind wandering in daily life. We thus 
addressed a fundamental question about the nature of cognitive ability—Do people who differ in intellectual 
capability also differ in subjective experience?— while also investigating a strong prediction of attentional 
WMC theories—Do people who differ in WMC also differentially experience the disruptive effects of mind 
wandering in daily life, at least in cognitively demanding contexts? 
 
To answer these questions, we tested WMC in a large sample of young adults, and in an ostensibly unrelated 
study, we assessed their daily-life experiences of mind wandering for 1 week. Several times daily, subjects 
indicated whether their thoughts were focused on their current activity and answered questions about their 
current context. Although WMC might predict mind-wandering rates overall, given its generality, an executive-
attention theory of WMC most strongly predicts that lower-WMC subjects should mind-wander more than 
higher-WMC subjects in life situations requiring substantial cognitive control and focused concentration (Engle 
& Kane, 2004). 
 
METHOD 
Subjects 
Of the 394 undergraduates who completed WMC screening, 126 volunteered for the subsequent ESM study to 
partially fulfill a course requirement. We collected usable ESM data from 124 subjects (35 male, 88 female, 1 
not identified), ages 17 through 35 years (M = 19.34, SD = 2.41, N = 123); the subjects were self-identified as 
67% Caucasian, 25% African American, 2% Hispanic, 3% Asian, and 3% ―other.‖  
 
WMC Screening 
In a 60-min session, subjects completed three complex span measures: OSPAN, RSPAN, and symmetry span 
(SSPAN) tasks. In these automated tasks, short lists of to-be-remembered items were presented, with each item 
preceded by an unrelated processing task with a response deadline (Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 2005). 
The deadline was tailored to each task and subject on the basis of latencies (M + 2.5 SDs) for 15 processing-
only practice items. The OSPAN processing task was verifying a simple equation involving a multiplication or 
division and then an addition or subtraction, the RSPAN processing task was verifying whether a 10- to 15-
word sentence was meaningful, and the SSPAN processing task was verifying whether a grid pattern was 
vertically symmetrical. For all tasks, each processing stimulus was presented until the subject responded or the 
deadline was reached; the memory item followed 200 ms later. Memory items appeared for 250 ms in the 
OSPAN and RSPAN tasks and for 650 ms in the SSPAN task; all memory items were followed immediately by 
the next processing stimulus or memory test. 
 
For the OSPAN and RSPAN tasks, lists consisted of 3 to 7 capitalized letters from a pool of 12; for the SSPAN 
task, the memoranda were the locations of two to five red squares within a 4 X 4 matrix. For all three tasks, 
three trials at each list length were presented in random order. In the memory tests for OSPAN and RSPAN 
lists, all 12 letters were always presented in the same locations, and subjects clicked a mouse on the previously 
presented letters in serial order. The SSPAN tests presented an empty 4 X 4 matrix, and subjects clicked the 
previously red squares in serial order. 
 
The score for each span task was the total number of items, across trials, recalled in correct serial position 
(Conway et al., 2005). We created a WMC composite for each subject by converting task scores to z scores and 
averaging them. The correlation (r) of task scores was .65 for OSPAN and RSPAN,.52 for OSPAN and SSPAN, 
and .55 for RSPAN and SSPAN, resulting in a normally distributed WMC composite (skew = -0.571; kurtosis = 
0.108). 
 
ESM Method 
Palm Pilot personal digital assistants (PDAs; model m100, m125, or m130) using iESP software (Barrett & 
Barrett, 2004; Intel Corporation, 2004) presented questionnaires and collected data via a stylus interface. A beep 
signaled subjects to complete eight questionnaires per day, between noon and midnight, for 7 days (plus part of 
the day following a training session). One signal occurred randomly during each of eight 90-min blocks; 
subjects had up to 5 min to initiate responding and up to 3 min to complete each question. 
 
The ESM questionnaire first asked subjects whether or not their thoughts had wandered from whatever they 
were doing at the time of the signal (with ―yes‖ coded as 1 and ―no‖ coded as 2). If so, they answered 2 
questions about perceived control over their thoughts and 3 questions about thought content (all ratings made on 
a Likert scale from 1, not at all, to 7, very much; see Table 1). All subjects, regardless of mind wandering, 
answered 18 Likert-scale questions about their context (see Table 2). 
 
Subjects received training in the ESM data-collection procedure in a 60-min session. The experimenter 
explained and provided examples of mind wandering and emphasized that subjects should take immediate stock 
of their thoughts upon hearing the PDA signal, and that their responses should reflect what they had been 
thinking or doing immediately before the beep. Subjects completed a practice questionnaire and were given 
written instructions and laboratory contact information. ESM signal blocks began as soon as they left the 
session. Subjects returned on Days 2 and 4 to download data; these visits minimized data loss from defective 
PDAs and encouraged regular completion of the protocols. To further increase compliance, we included 
subjects who completed at least 70% of the ESM questionnaires in a drawing for one of two $100 gift cards. 
 
 
 
Statistical Analyses 
ESM data have a hierarchical structure in which questionnaire responses (Level 1 data) are nested within 
participants (Level 2 data), and so they are best analyzed with multilevel or hierarchical linear modeling (e.g., 
Nezlek, 2001; Schwartz & Stone, 1998). We focused our analyses primarily on the cross-level interactions of 
the relations between Level 1 ESM variables (mind wandering and its contextual correlates) and the Level 2 
variable (WMC). Cross-level interactions indicate that within-person associations at Level 1 vary as a function 
of the Level 2 variable. For example, the relation between mind wandering and boredom (both Level 1, within-
person variables) might change as a function of WMC (a Level 2, between-persons variable), with higher-WMC 
subjects staying mentally on task regardless of boredom and lower-WMC subjects mind-wandering more with 
increasing boredom. We evaluated cross-level interactions by estimating the effect of WMC on the within-
person Level 1 slopes, using the equation β1 = γ10 + γ11(WMC) + μ1, where γ10 is the mean of the Level 1 slope, 
γ11 is the effect of WMC, and μ1 is the error term. In addition, we computed the intercept of the Level 2 analyses 
using the formula β0 = γ00 + γ01(WMC) + μ0, where γ00 is the mean value of the Level 1 dependent measure, γ01 
is the effect of WMC, and μ0 is the error term. The γ01 co-efficient provides information comparable to that of 
the un-standardized regression weight of the Level 2 predictor (WMC) on the Level 1 dependent variable. 
 
In all analyses, we group-centered the Level 1 ESM predictors (i.e., high or low values on any variable, such as 
boredom, were relative to each subject‘s own scores) and grand-mean-centered the Level 2 scores for WMC 
(Luke, 2004; Paccagnella, 2006); as in simple regression, dependent variables were not centered. Some data 
departed from normality, so we calculated parameter estimates using robust standard errors (Hox, 2002). For 
null-hypothesis tests, we used an alpha of .05; we converted p values to prep (the probability of replicating an 
effect‘s direction given similar methods; Killeen, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Subjects completed an average of 43.5 (SD = 9.5, range = 20–60) usable ESM questionnaires; completion rate 
did not correlate significantly with mind-wandering rate, r(124) = .05, or WMC, r(124) = .14, although the weak 
correlation with WMC may be replicable (prep = .80). 
 
Rate and Phenomenology of Mind Wandering 
The rate of mind wandering was consistent with that found in prior work. Subjects reported mind-wandering at 
almost one third of the signals (mean rate = .30), but there was considerable variation around that mean (SD = 
.17, range = .00 –.92). On occasions when subjects reported off-task thought, they generally expressed little 
surprise that their mind had wandered (M = 2.40, SD = 0.96) and indicated that they had mentally disengaged 
on purpose (M = 3.99, SD = 1.18).
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 Their off-task thoughts focused most on everyday things (M = 4.34, SD = 
1.02), significantly less on fantasies (M = 3.77, SD = 1.18), t(122) = -3.86, prep ≥ .99, and still less on worries 
(M = 3.14, SD = 1.12), t(122) = -4.26, prep > .99. Mind wandering about typical events and plans was thus a 
common experience (Klinger, 1978), but its frequency varied widely among subjects. 
 
Contextual Predictors of Mind Wandering 
We first analyzed whether self-reported mind wandering was systematically associated with particular contexts. 
As depicted in Table 2, subjects‘ thoughts wandered more when they were tired or stressed, when they were in 
stimulating-to-chaotic environments, and when they were involved in boring or unpleasant activities (including 
schoolwork). Subjects‘ minds wandered less when they felt happy and competent, when they concentrated, and 
when they were involved in enjoyable activities. The importance, novelty, or challenge of activities, how-ever, 
did not significantly predict mind wandering (nor did recent use of caffeine, cigarettes, or alcohol, although the 
prep values for these weak effects suggest replicability). Most of these findings are not surprising, but they 
support the validity of subjects‘ ESM responses. Indeed, the fact that not all our intuitions were confirmed (e.g., 
challenging or important activities did not discourage mind wandering) suggests that responses were not 
determined by folk theories or demand characteristics. 
 
Mind Wandering and WMC 
As expected, laboratory-assessed WMC was unrelated to the overall rate of on-task thoughts versus mind 
wandering in daily life, averaged across all contexts, b = 0.024, SE = 0.022, t(122) = 1.22. Analyses of cross-
level interactions therefore tested whether WMC affected the within-person relation between mind wandering 
and any contextual (Level 1) variables, particularly those that mirrored laboratory contexts in which WMC 
predicts successful executive control. 
 
The Impact of Cognitive Demand 
One salient feature of laboratory tasks on which lower-WMC subjects show executive-control deficits is their 
cognitive demand: They are challenging and require prolonged effort and concentration. Thus, our first set of 
multilevel analyses examined the moderating effect of WMC on the within-person relation between mind 
wandering and self-reported concentration, challenge of the activity, and required effort. As depicted in Figure 
1a, not only did mind wandering decrease and on-task thoughts increase with self-reported concentration (see 
Table 2), but WMC significantly moderated this within-person association, b = 0.022, SE = 0.006, t(122) = 
3.98, prep > .99. (All our analyses treated WMC as a continuous variable, but for ease of illustration, the figure 
presents the mean within-person slopes for subjects in the top and bottom WMC quartiles.) Higher-WMC 
subjects showed a stronger relation (a steeper slope) between concentration and mind wandering than did lower-
WMC subjects. At the highest levels of self-reported concentration, higher-WMC subjects were much less 
likely to mind-wander than were lower-WMC subjects; indeed, under extreme concentration, higher-WMC 
subjects‘ thoughts were focused almost perfectly on the task. At the lowest levels of self-reported concentration, 
however, when demands were low, higher-WMC subjects were more likely to mind-wander than were lower-
WMC subjects. 
 
WMC had a different moderating effect on the relations of mind wandering with both the challenge of the 
activity (Fig. 1b) and the effort demanded by the activity (Fig. 1c). Although neither challenge nor effort 
significantly predicted mind wandering overall (see Table 2), their cross-level interactions with WMC were 
significant: b = 0.010, SE = 0.005, t(122) = 2.06, prep = .89, for challenge and b = 0.010, SE = 0.004, t(122) = 
2.20, prep = .91, for effort. In this case, lower-WMC subjects‘ mind wandering responded more to context. 
Whereas higher-WMC subjects‘ thoughts remained steadily on task regardless of challenge or effort, lower-
WMC subjects‘ minds wandered more under greater challenge and effort. Thus, rather than zoning out as tasks 
became easier, people with lower WMC failed to control thought as tasks got harder. 
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The Impact of Subjects’ Feelings About Their Activities 
A second salient feature of laboratory tasks on which lower-WMC subjects show executive-control deficits is 
their low intrinsic interest and their potential to arouse anxiety. These tasks are unfamiliar, long, and repetitive; 
they present impoverished stimuli; they have no obvious practical relevance; and they may be perceived as 
evaluative. Some subjects leave experiments with these tasks somewhat anxious; more leave bored or grouchy. 
 
We therefore tested whether WMC moderated the association between mind wandering and the unimportance, 
unpleasantness, or stress of the task; feelings of anxiety, boredom, or un-happiness; or poor fit between the task 
and subjects‘ ability. As shown in Table 3, WMC played no moderating role in the case of these variables. 
Regardless of WMC , subjects‘ minds wandered more when they were bored, were stressed, were bad at their 
current activity, and disliked their current activity; regardless of WMC, mind wandering was independent of the 
current activity‘s importance. Thus, WMC-related differences in mind wandering did not arise during relatively 
unpleasant or nonengaging moments. 
 
These null effects are important for several reasons, particularly for the light they shed on the significant 
interactions we reported for WMC and cognitive demand.3 First, like the null effect of WMC on mind 
wandering overall, they show that WMC is not systematically related to the willingness or ability to report one‘s 
cognitive foibles; high-WMC subjects did not simply resist admitting mind wandering. Second, they 
demonstrate that the significant interactions involving WMC did not represent subjects‘ folk theories, because 
beliefs about the relation between mind wandering and boredom are certainly as strong as those relating mind 
wandering to concentration and challenge. Third, and finally, they suggest that WMC-related differences in 
mind wandering and thought control were not purely motivational, for lower-WMC subjects were not more 
likely than higher-WMC subjects to mentally disengage from activities they found boring, unpleasant, or 
unimportant. Instead, individual differences in WMC predicted mind wandering selectively, only when life 
activities posed great challenges and required considerable effort and concentration. 
 
Mind Wandering and Metaconsciousness 
In laboratory tasks, low-WMC subjects make frequent errors that may reflect attention lapses. Such results 
suggest they have a deficit in metaconsciousness (Schooler, 2002), whereby they fail to realize when their 
thoughts drift from their primary activities. However, our ESM data showed no relation between WMC and 
surprise at having mind-wandered, b = -0.001, SE = 0.111, t(121) < 1, and surprise interacted with WMC and 
only one contextual predictor (‗‗there is a lot going on around me‖), so this interaction may be spurious. That 
said, we are not confident that ―surprise‖ is the most appropriate phenomenological description of 
metaconscious dissociations (or the zoning-out experience), and given the very low base rate of strong 
―surprise‖ responses in our data, future work must investigate the relations among WMC, metaconsciousness, 
and mind wandering more fully. 
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In a unique effort to study the phenomenology of cognitive ability in everyday life, we found that individual 
differences in WMC, objectively measured in the laboratory, predicted people‘s subjective experience of mind 
wandering during particular daily situations. Future research should assess how such mind-wandering 
differences might vary with actual and perceived performance on activities. Do high-WMC people have the 
resources to mentally ―time share‖ and still perform tasks well? Do low-WMC people mind-wander more in 
more challenging, effortful tasks because they are actually performing less well or because they believe they are 
performing less well? Subjective assessments of performance in daily life, as well as laboratory assessments of 
both mind wandering and objective task performance, will help answer these questions. 
 
 
The present study was motivated by an executive-attention theory of WMC variation (Engle & Kane, 2004), 
which holds that the impressive, general predictive power of WMC tasks derives from their tapping an ability to 
maintain access to information and goals in the face of distraction, interference, and shifts of conscious focus. 
People with lower WMC are less able than people with higher WMC to sustain goal-directed thought and 
behavior in the face of competition from environmental and mental events. Moreover, according to an 
executive-control theory of mind wandering (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), off-task thoughts represent the 
withdrawal of executive resources from one‘s ostensible primary task toward mental pursuit of other personal 
goals, thus leaving fewer resources for the primary task. 
 
We therefore predicted, and found, that people of lower WMC mind-wandered more than people of higher 
WMC when their activities required considerable effort and focused concentration: WMC predicted attention 
control during life‘s challenges. However, WMC variation did not affect the relation between mind wandering 
and either the enjoyment or the importance of an activity, indicating that WMC‘s effects on thought control 
were not merely motivational or artifactual. Although our central findings of WMC-related variation in real-
world executive control are consistent with several attention-related WMC theories (Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 
2007; Cowan, 2005; Lustig et al., 2001), they are not predicted by nonattentional views, for ex-ample, proposals 
that WMC and complex span performance reflect primarily domain-specific skills, such as reading, math, or 
spatial ability (e.g., MacDonald & Christiansen, 2002), or particular strategic behaviors (e.g., McNamara & 
Scott, 2001). 
 
WMC broadly predicts performance on attention-control tasks and the experience of attentional lapses, in the 
laboratory and in everyday life. Our study also suggests that mind wandering is a promising phenomenon in 
which to examine executive control (Smallwood & Schooler, 2006), and that ESM is a promising method for 
examining the subjectivity of cognitive function and dysfunction—and testing cognitive theory—in ecologically 
valid contexts. 
 
Notes: 
1Data from 123 subjects were analyzed; 1 subject never reported mind wandering. 
 
2 Although cross-level interactions involving ratings of challenge and effort were similar, these items were not 
redundant: Their Level 1 correlation across contexts was substantial, but imperfect, r(5369) = .65. 
 
3 No other cross-level interactions involving WMC and mind wandering were significant. 
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